The end of September and beginning of October saw my Global War on Terror class discussing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict during the 2000s and early 2010s (I’m teaching this class backwards – from the present back to 100 years ago. It’s been interesting…but that’s another story for another day). Given the events of the last two weeks, I feel like I won’t have any problem linking all of the problems we’ve been talking about to current events. However, as I’ve watched the news over the last day, I’ve seen a lot of overly simplistic opinions about this conflict. While I certainly don’t have any answers (okay, I do, but none that would be given any traction in American foreign policy circles), I do want to try to add some necessary background to this latest and most gruesome chapter in the cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence.
Some Background
As antisemitism increased around the world – particularly in Europe and Russia, Jews began looking for places where they could go to escape pogroms (see Russia in the late-19th and early 20th centuries), antisemitic conspiracy theories (see Protocols of the Elders of Zion, also originating in Russia), and false accusations of malfeasance based on antisemitic tropes (see The Dreyfus Affair in France in the late-19th century). Theodor Herzl, a secular Jew from Austria, wrote the foundational text of Jewish nationalism (Zionism), Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”), in which he argued that expanding antisemitism required the creation of a state where Jews could be free from persecution. While his preference was the creation of that state in Palestine, he also floated the idea of purchasing land in Argentina as a possibility.
It cannot be overstated here that at this point, this conflict was not religious at all. Herzl and other early Zionists were thoroughly secular. Herzl himself found Jerusalem to be a backwards, premodern place unbefitting a modern people. He also had little use for the Jews of Palestine at the time who were far too tied to religion for his taste. Nevertheless, the historic ties to Palestine were too strong for the Jewish people to ignore and they began immigrating to the Holy Land in waves (called aliyah) beginning in the early 1880s, first from Russia, then from Europe.
Prior to 1920, when the Ottoman Empire was officially carved up by the European powers, Jews and indigenous Arabs in what was then the Ottoman province of Palestine generally coexisted. However, once the British assumed control of territory and Jews and Arabs began espousing competing nationalist sentiments, conflicts escalated and fighting became more common. After World War II, the British, demoralized and cash-strapped, abandoned the former Mandate of Palestine, leaving it to the newly-formed United Nations to figure out. The UN was equally unsure (and unprepared) to deal with the mess in Palestine, and eventually the Jews took matters into their own hands. The Israeli Declaration of Independence was read by David Ben Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, standing under a picture of Theodor Herzl on May 14, 1948.
War broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbors almost immediately and continued until January 1949. The Armistice Line of 1949 gave us the map that we basically still have today:
The Gaza Strip was more or less autonomous for a decade before Egypt put its foot down there in 1959, an unrelenting occupation that would continue until the Israeli military victory in June, 1967. The West Bank was formally annexed by Jordan in late-1950 with Palestinians there accepting Jordanian rule. Palestinians in the West Bank were granted Jordanian citizenship and allowed to run for seats in Jordan’s parliament. Despite the defeat of Jordan in 1967, Palestinians retained Jordanian citizenship until 1988 when Jordan officially severed claims to the territory and recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole representative of Palestinian national aspirations.
While May 1948 was seen by Israelis as the culmination of decades of struggle, Palestinians saw it much differently. Among Palestinians, 1948 is called al-Nakba (“the catastrophe”). Palestinians living in the newly declared state of Israel were forced out and into refugee camps, marking the beginning of the Palestinian refugee crisis. That crisis was only exacerbated by the June 1967 War.
The June 1967 War completely changed the calculus of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the end of the war, Israel had claimed and occupied the Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula (from Egypt), the West Bank – including East Jerusalem (from Jordan), and the Golan Heights (from Syria). The capture of East Jerusalem from Jordan added a new religious layer to the conflict as the Old City and all of the Holy Sites are there and had, thus, been under Jordanian control for close to 20 years, and Jordan had refused to allow Jewish pilgrimage to the Old City during that time (despite a UN resolution requiring it). When Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited the newly liberated Western Wall, he famously said, “We have returned to the holiest of our Holy Places, never to part from it again.”
This sentiment was echoed and, in many cases, magnified by religious Israelis who saw it as their obligation to reclaim all of historic Palestine which they believed was given to them by God in perpetuity. Therefore, shortly after Israel’s victory in 1967, construction on Israeli settlements throughout the territories it occupied began. Palestinians and many international human rights organizations claim this to be a violation of international law, specifically the 4th Geneva Convention which renders it unlawful for a civilian population to be transferred to militarily occupied lands.
Six years later, the greatest intelligence failure in Israeli history (until Oct. 7) happened when Egypt launched a surprise attack against Israel during Yom Kippur (October 6, 1973) to attempt to regain control of the Sinai Peninsula, especially the east bank of the Suez Canal. When the conflict ended, Egypt survived, regained control of Suez, and eventually secured a peace accord with Israel which gave them all of the Sinai back (the Camp David Accords, signed in 1978).
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The next decade marked a deterioration in conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, especially Gaza. Settlements began to proliferate, and Israel dispatched military units to protect them, limiting the movement of Palestinians and subjecting them to curfews, collective punishments, home demolitions, extended detentions, and excessive wait times at security checkpoints to enter Israel where many Gazans worked. During the late 1970s and early 80s, Palestinian leadership – in the form of Yassir Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) – was in exile, first in Beirut (from which they were expelled during the Lebanese Civil War) then in Tunisia. While the PLO was secular, the local organizations that emerged in Gaza during this time were decidedly Islamist and affiliated, at least nominally, with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Gaza was a tinderbox by the time 1987 rolled around, so it shouldn’t have surprised anyone that what was a seemingly ordinary event (an Israeli settler was stabbed in Gaza, then an Israeli military vehicle veered into a line of Palestinian cars, killing several) spawned a massive wave of protests among the Palestinians called the Intifada (Arabic for “to shake something off.” Here, that something is occupation). The First Intifada was a largely nonviolent protest movement that included work stoppages, sit-ins, barricades, and throwing rocks at the Israeli military. Israel’s often excessive responses drew widespread international condemnation and, for the first time, international attention and sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
Let the reader understand: Prior to December 1987, the Palestinians were little more than bit players in the drama that surrounded them. They had no government, no military, no police force, and only shaky representation on the international stage. Events happened to them, rather than the Palestinians having any power to actually shape events for themselves. What’s more, except for the Jordanians, every nation surrounding the Palestinians was actively hostile to them in some way or another, none more so than Israel. The First Intifiada was the first time that the Palestinians took center stage in their own struggle. It was also the event that marked the genesis of Hamas.
Understanding Hamas
Hamas is a terrorist organization, but it’s not only a terrorist organization. It’s a political party, but also a social movement. It’s both an “anti-system” party and semi-democratic (when the circumstances are right). In other words, to pigeon hole Hamas or worse, to pigeon hole “supporters” of Hamas as one thing or another misses lots of nuance.
Hamas was created in the immediate aftermath of the First Intifada and moved quickly to organize on the ground in Gaza to help those who were participating in protests. With the PLO in exile, Hamas was better positioned to render aid and, therefore, gain popular support among Palestinians. In 1988, Hamas published its charter which was unequivocal in its desire to destroy the state of Israel. This message was reiterated in a pamphlet published in the summer of 1988, unambiguously titled “From the Sea to the River,” a reference to a desire to create a Palestinian state (and thus destroy Israel) from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. However, for all of its anti-Israeli sentiment, Hamas did not carry out any suicide attacks within Israeli borders until April 1994, in response to Israeli settler violence at the Mosque of the Patriarchs in Hebron which left 29 Palestinians dead and over 100 injured. While Hamas was planning and thinking about how best to carry out suicide attacks for several years by that point, the timing of this first attack cannot be ignored.
While suicide attacks are what Hamas is infamous for, that is not the only thing the organization provides. In fact, most of Hamas’ yearly expenditures are allocated to social services: housing and unemployment assistance, food pantries and soup kitchens, schools and playgrounds, hospitals and medical clinics. These services are especially important in Gaza where, after Israeli “disengagement” in 2005, Palestinians have been unable to travel outside of the territory except in extreme circumstances related to medical needs. It’s easy to label Hamas’ motivations for providing this aid to Gazans as craven – after all, people are a lot more likely to ignore the violent aftertaste of suicide bombings when the organization carrying them out is also putting a roof over your family’s head, food on the table, and making your kids feel better when they get sick. While there is certainly truth to this, the group is nevertheless providing vital services to the Palestinian people (and, it should be noted, with the tacit consent of Israel who allows Qatar to funnel money for humanitarian projects to the group).
Hamas has also been involved in political projects almost since its inception. At first, its members ran for seats in professional and student unions throughout the Palestinian Territories, abided by election results, and opposed PA attempts to appoint rather than elect mayors and municipal councils as antidemocratic. Eventually, they would run for positions on city councils, though the question of whether to participate in parliamentary elections was a much thornier one because of concerns that running for seats in a national governing body created by the Oslo Accords might mean implicit acceptance of the peace agreement which Hamas roundly panned as selling out the Palestinian cause.
When Hamas finally came around to the importance of competing for seats in parliamentary elections, mostly to combat the corruption that was rampant in the PA, its victory in such endeavors was thwarted – not just by factions of the PLO, but by the United States as well, which supported efforts by Yasser Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, to undermine Hamas’ electoral success. Hamas, for its part, chose to participate in the 2006 elections precisely because it hoped that its willingness to participate in the democratic process would cause international actors to take it more seriously as a representative of Palestinian national aspirations.
Instead, the old guard of the PA (Abbas and company) watched as the US and other international actors cut off all international aid to the new government which led to massive strikes by government officials who couldn’t receive a salary. Furthermore, as president of the PA, Abbas had the power to issue executive orders himself that undercut Hamas at every turn. The net result was to completely freeze Hamas out of the political process which itself is currently in a state of suspended animation: there have been no presidential elections since 2005 (Abbas’ first term in office technically expired in 2009) and no parliamentary elections since 2006. Because of Israel’s disengagement from and blockade of Gaza, the Palestinians now, functionally, have two competing governments – one in Gaza (Hamas) and one in the West Bank (the Palestinian Authority) – neither of which recognize the authority of the other.
However, it cannot be ignored that Hamas showed during the 2000s that it was willing to soften its rhetoric toward Israel when it felt that doing so would garner more support from the international community. In 2002, one Hamas leader argued that if Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders and agree to a long-term cease fire (at least two decades), the Palestinians would be so busy building their own state that they wouldn’t care what Israel was doing next door. He was killed in an Israeli air strike the next year. Hamas’ decision to participate in 2006 elections was similarly designed to show the international community that it was willing to work toward, if not peace, at least a cessation of hostilities, but that decision was met with massive resistance from the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and Israel. The unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza in 2006 only exacerbated the problems in Gaza. While Israel argues that it no longer “occupies” Gaza, it certainly controls Gaza as every border crossing, the shoreline, and the air are controlled by Israeli forces and people can only leave Gaza in cases of great medical hardship.
When I was in Israel in 2009, I took this picture along the main pedestrian thoroughfare in Bethlehem. This is Hamas graffiti (the larger image is “Hamas” in Arabic, the longer phrase in the upper left hand corner of the picture is the full name of the organization, harakat al-muqawima al-Islamiyya, in Arabic).
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This was fairly emblematic of where the Palestinians were in 2009. Familiarity bred contempt, and Hamas was seen more favorably in the West Bank because Palestinians there were sick of the corruption in the Palestinian Authority. The situation in Gaza was somewhat different because Hamas was able to galvanize support after the Israeli military excursion known as Operation: Cast Lead in late-2008 and early-2009. The Israeli Defense Forces were accused during Cast Lead of collective punishment, excessive use of force, and the use of white phosphorus weapons, which are known to cause painful burns on the skin of anyone exposed to them. Hamas was accused of using the civilian population of Gaza as human shields and attacking civilians in Israel with indiscriminate missile strikes. This was neither the first time nor the last that both sides have been accused of legion bad behaviors. This happens in nearly every military confrontation they have, including the current conflict.
Let the reader understand: Much of the news coverage of Hamas over the last two weeks has created a two-dimensional caricature of the organization. It is possible to both recognize that Hamas’ tactics are criminal and that Hamas has changed and altered its rhetoric and behavior when the situation called for a different approach. We must also confront the fact that Hamas’ intransigence cannot be divorced from Israeli actions toward the Palestinians. While there is no guarantee that Hamas’ stated desire to work within the system after the 2006 elections would have come to fruition, it is absolutely certain that such moderation was never going to happen after the total Israeli blockade of Gaza and American support of PA actions to undermine the group’s ability to govern following its victory. Furthermore, simply condemning Hamas as an organization that refuses to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist ignores the internal debates in the organization about whether that is still truly representative of the group’s position or simply a rhetorical position that it takes when strategically convenient.
Where We Are Today
The last two years have featured both an escalation in the conflict in the West Bank and a concomitant hardening of political positions among Israelis and Palestinians alike. Prime Minister (again) Benjamin Netanyahu, long a hard-liner in Israeli politics, has appointed far right-wing ministers to his cabinet who are openly hostile to Palestinian nationalism and even the need to protect Palestinian human rights. Under Netanyahu, settlements have expanded in the West Bank, which has led to increasing restrictions on Palestinians’ freedom of movement along with the expected appropriation of Palestinian land by Israelis and the demolition of Palestinian neighborhoods, villages, and farmland. Beatings, arrests, and deaths among Palestinians have also skyrocketed over the last two years with 2023 already on pace (prior to this conflict) to be the deadliest year for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in the last 20 years. Attacks by Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews against Palestinians as well as Israelis excursions to the top of the Temple Mount (home of the Dome of the Rock and off limits to Jews) have also increased with little to no effort by Israeli officials to deter them.
Despite Gaza no longer being “occupied” as such, there is no freedom in Gaza. All of the border crossings are closed to Palestinians, there is an Israeli naval blockade, and Israeli drones and aircraft patrol the airspace above Gaza. It is, in essence, an open air prison for almost 2 million people, half of whom live below the poverty line, nearly 50% of whom are unemployed, and the majority of whom are 18 or under with few prospects for a better life. Furthermore, Gaza’s utilities are provided predominantly by Israel (the rest are provided by Egypt) who has been known to turn off the electricity to all or part of Gaza as collective punishment for attacks by militants (a violation of international law). Because of fuel shortages (as fuel is also provided by Israel), hospitals in Gaza often face the reality of generator power that may or may not last until either the power is turned back on or fuel supplies can be replenished.
Let the reader understand: 75 years of occupation, refugee camps, and Israeli actions that amount to violations of international law and/or war crimes have created a sense of anger, resentment, and restiveness among the Palestinians. In The West Wing’s four episode arc related to this issue, perhaps the most important observation comes from Kate Harper (played by Mary McCormick):
However repugnant Hamas’ activities – not just two weeks ago, but throughout its history – to divorce its actions from the on-going resistance to Israeli occupation ignores important context and ties the hands of everyone who wants to try to fix this situation. The Palestinians have ample reason to continue to be angry with the Israeli government (and their own, for that matter). Hamas cannot be bombed out of existence as long as the conditions that gave rise to its existence remain. Over half of the residents of Gaza are now displaced; many of them have no homes to return to because of Israeli bombardment of their neighborhoods. Eliminating Hamas’ command and control is a short-term fix that will not solve the real problem: until the Palestinians have freedom – freedom of movement, freedom to pursue economic opportunities, freedom to have a state of their own, the anger, the resentment that birthed Hamas will remain and in five or ten or fifteen years, the children who have lost most or all of their families in the last two weeks will be the next leaders of Hamas or something worse.
The Tragedy of Occupation
As we have learned more about the Israelis who were killed or kidnapped two weeks ago, the deep human tragedy of this whole ordeal, not just the events of October 7, but the circumstances that preceded it have become terribly apparent. Many of the people Hamas killed or kidnapped were deeply committed to peace and to advocating for a new way of doing things that would make lives better for both Palestinians and Israelis. One of the women who was kidnapped is a leader of an Israeli women’s organization whose sole purpose was the meet women and children leaving Gaza for medical treatment in Israel to accompany them to the hospital, keep them company, communicate with their families in Gaza, and ensure that those people were safe, cared for, and not alone. These women realized that they could not convince Benjamin Netanyahu or his government to change their policies, but they could take steps to ease the discomfort of those Palestinians who needed medical care and were not given permission to have any family accompany them.
Hamas has set the cause of the Palestinians back not just because they have given the Israeli government, already hostile to Palestinian demands for self-determination, an excuse to respond to its actions with massive military force, but also because they have trampled, maybe irreparably, on the goodwill of Israelis who want a different path forward, one that recognizes the shared humanity of Israelis and Palestinians and the shared desire to achieve a just and peaceful resolution to this 75-year-long conflict.
Hamas would not exist if not for Israeli occupation. Hamas’ suicide bombings would not have begun if not for Israeli occupation. The constant threat of violence against both Israeli and Palestinian civilians is a result of generations of Israeli politicians deciding to perpetuate an unjust occupation against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What’s more, the deep human tragedy of the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories has only emboldened forces around the world who have contempt for Jewish and Muslim people. Antisemitism and Islamophobia are on the rise around the world, and the events of the last two weeks have only made them more of a threat for Jewish and Muslim populations. We have, sadly, seen the evidence of that play out in this country with the senseless killing of a young Palestinian boy in Chicago and this weekend’s murder of a Jewish leader in Detroit.
At times like these, we must commit ourselves to being able to walk and chew gum at the same time. We can both abhor the actions of Hamas and call for Israel to exercise restraint in its military response in Gaza. We can condemn the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu and his government while demanding that Israeli civilians, many of them deeply concerned with the actions of their government, be protected from violence. We can recognize that the actions of Israeli politicians and Palestinian militants are deeply problematic and often unlawful while speaking out against rhetoric demanding collective guilt or violence against Jews and Muslims around the world.
The excessive and terrible violence of Hamas’ attack on Israel two weeks ago must be roundly condemned. However, that attack did not occur in a vacuum, and if we ignore the context of occupation and Israel’s policies that continue to violate the basic human rights of the Palestinian community, we cannot, will not be able to prevent another such tragedy from happening. The United States must exhibit some real leadership and pressure the Israeli government to put an end to actions that are detrimental to a real and lasting peace. What Hamas has done is unconscionable. However, only one side here has any real power to end this conflict: the side with a functioning government and a powerful military. Israel alone has the capability to end this violence once and for all. The leadership in Israel right now has no desire to do so. Unless and until there are real consequences to their continued oppression of the Palestinian people, this cycle of violence will continue and more people – innocent Israelis and Palestinians – will pay the price.
